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Terry and the Pirates:
Constitutionality of Airport
Searches and Seizures
By JAMEs A. BRODSKY*
Since January 1, 1961 there have been some 159 hijackings of
United States commercial aircraft.' For the calendar year 1978,
only two domestic hijacking attempts were recorded.2  Many
people ascribe this striking drop in hijacking attempts3 during 1978
and 1974 to the new Federal Aviation Administration [hereinafter
F.A.A.] anti-hijacking program, which went into full effect Feb-
ruary 16, 1978. 4 The purpose of this paper is not to determine
whether the new procedures have caused the reduction in hijack-
ings. Indeed, as there were only two hijackings during the last
quarter of calendar year 1972, before the new procedures took
effect, one could argue that the decline occurred independently
of and prior to the implementation of the new procedures. The
writer will discuss the constitutionality of the new procedures,
with reference specifically to the admissibility of evidence seized
by means of the current F.A.A. screening procedures. To do this,
it will be necessary initially to relate the history of the anti-hijack-
ing program which has led to the implementation of the current
screening procedures. Then the constitutional issues involved
with search and seizure under previous screening procedures will
* Ass't Professor of Law, University of South Dakota. A.B., 1967, University
of Iowa; J.D., 1971, Harvard; M.P.A., 1971, John F. Kennedy School of Govern-
ment, Harvard University. The author served as a trial attorney in the Criminal
Division of the Department of Justice from September, 1971 through July, 1972
and was an alternate member of the Inter-agency Committee on Air Transportation
Security during that time.
I F.A.A. and Department of Justice statistics provided to this writer. See Ap-
pendix.
2 Id. As of June 1, 1974, there had been one hijacking attempt this year.
a There were 40 hijackings in 1969, 27 in 1970, 27 in 1971, and 29 in 1972.
There were only two hi*ackings in 1973; and as of June 1, 1974, one attempted
hijacking had occurred this year. See Appendix to this article.
4 OFFICE OF Am TRANsPORTATION SECUTY, Ant SECUIr BuLumrq 72-2
(December 19, 1972).
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be examined, comparing the results there with the likely results
under the current procedures. Finally, there will be a discussion
of proposals for future anti-hijacking programs.
I. HISTORY OF TE AN -HIJACING PROGRAM
Skyjacking, while a relatively recent phenomenon in the
United States, has long been known in foreign lands. The first
recorded skyjacking, which occurred in 1930, was perpetrated
by Peruvian revolutionaries. 6 Although there were no further sky-
jackings until 1947, the world-wide incidents from 1947 until 1971
shared a common element with that 1930 seizure-they were all
carried out for political purposes.
The first pirating of an American aircraft occurred on May 1,
1961. Antilio Ramirez-Ortiz boarded an Eastern Airlines aircraft
in Marathon, Florida and ordered it taken to Cuba.7 Thus began
the wave of hijackings to Cuba, which has only recently subsided.
From 1961 through 1967, only 14 United States aircraft were sky-
jacked, an average of two per year for that period." In 1968, how-
ever, a sharp increase was reported as 22 planes were com-
mandeered.9 This trend continued in 1969, when 40 domestic
aircraft were hijacked, and 34 of these hijackings proved "suc-
cessful". 10 In 1970, there were 27 skyjackings of domestic aircraft,
18 of which were successful. A turning point in the history of
air piracy surely occurred in September of 1970 when three
Palestinian guerrillas hijacked and destroyed four commercial
carrier aircraft, two of which were American." The actions of
the Palestinian guerrillas precipitated an international crisis in
civil aviation, and President Nixon's response to this crisis resulted
in the establishment of this nation's Civil Aviation Security Pro-
gram12 intended to "deal with the menace of air piracy." 3. It has
5 The terms "air piracy" and "skyjacking" are used interchangeably in this
article.
6 J. Anxy, Tim SKY PnRATEs 49 (1972) [hereinafter cited as AREY].
7 ARay 55.
8 F.A.A. and Department of Justice statistics, supra note 1.
9Id.
10 Id. A "successful" hijacking is one in which the hijacker is able to success-
fully commandeer an aircraft and reach the destination he seeks without being
captured.
11 N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1970, at 1, col. 4.
12 Id. at col. 5.
13 Id. at 11, col. 5. See also 1970 PUBLIc PAPERS or PnEsmWNTs OF THE
UNTED STATES: RicHAmD NmxON 742-43 (1971).
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been an inter-agency program since inception, with participation
by Departments of Transportation, Justice, Treasury, and Defense,
and with the Secretary of Transportation designated the opera-
tional director.
Everyone involved in the Civil Aviation Security Program
agreed from the start that the principal effort to prevent skyjack-
ings would have to occur on the ground. The goal was to screen
potential hijackers well enough to prevent them from boarding
the aircraft and carrying out their plans. The program was
initially voluntary, and naturally, few airlines complied fully with
the guidelines.' 4 Thus, the reliance on voluntary airline compli-
ance failed to keep hijackers off airplanes.
The hijacking success rate dropped in 1971, when only 12 of
27 attempts were successful. But in that year, hidden by the drop
in the percentage of successful hijackings from 67% in 1970 to
44% in 1971 and the reduction in attempted hijackings to Cuba,
a new motive for skyjacking was added when on Thanksgiving
Eve a man known to this day only as "D. B. Cooper" parachuted
out of a National Airlines jet somewhere between Seattle, Wash-
ington and Reno, Nevada, with $200,000 in extorted funds.
Neither he nor the money has been found and while "Cooper"
may not be alive today, one certain result of his daring escapade
was its emulation by other would-be "Coopers". Twenty-one
of the thirty-seven subsequent hijackings have had extortion as
a major motive. Fortunately, all 21 failed-every emulator has
been either prosecuted or separated from his ransom.15 However,
the rash of extortion-motivated air piracies (29 domestic hijack-
ings occurred in the eight months following the November 24,
1971 incident) 16 made it clear that a mandatory pre-boarding
screening process was required to keep hijackers off the planes. 7
14 Perhaps not surprisingly, the F.A.A. has told this writer that Eastern Air-
lines and National Airlines, the principal targets of skyjackers because of their
Miami routes, were complying most fully under the voluntary program. Eastern had
instituted the use of magnetometers at each of its gates, for example. See 36 Fed.
Reg. 19173-74 (1971) (proposing new rule 14 C.F.R. § 121.538) (1973); and id.
at 19172-73 (proposing new rule 14 C.F.R. § 107) (1973) (directed to airport
operators).
15 Data from Department of justice supplied this writer. A list of all U.S.
hijackings and the current status of all hijackers is included as an appendix to this
article.
16 Id.




Thus, on December 5, 1972, the Secretary of Transportation
announced emergency amendments to the regulations governing
the Civil Aviation Security Program."" These amendments became
effective January 5, 1973, and required all airlines to inspect
carry-on baggage for weapons, explosives or other dangerous
items before permitting the passenger to board the aircraft. These
regulations further require the airline to inspect the passenger's
physical person for weapons, either by use of a metal detector,"9
or, in its absence, by means of a consent search. If the passenger
refuses to undergo any part of the pre-boarding screening process,
he will be denied the privilege of boarding.20
The regulations also require airport operators to provide local
law enforcement officers to support the pre-board screening
process.2 1 The local law enforcement officer must be present
throughout the procedure, which is defined as continuing until
the aircraft has taxied away from the boarding area. These
amended regulations became effective February 16, 1973.22
Prosecutions of skyjacking and related offenses have also
recently increased. During 1972 two hijackers were sentenced to
life imprisonment, and two others were given provisional life
sentences (one of which was modified to 30 years); one was
sentenced to 45 years imprisonment, one to 40 years, one to 30
years, and five others to 20 years each, while another was con-
victed May 16, 1973, on retrial, after a mistrial was declared in
January, 197.23 As for the 1973 offenders,24 Charles A. Wenige
was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment on charges of assaulting
a federal officer and interstate tranportation of stolen firearms,
and Daniel Clark was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment under
49 U.S.C. § 1472(i). The sole 1974 offender, Samuel Byck, died
during the attempted hijacking.25
18 14 C.F.R. § 107 (1973); 14 C.F.R. § 121.538 (1973). See also Department
of Transportation Press Release No. 103-72, Dec. 5, 1972.
19 The so-called magnetometer.
20 14 C.F.R. § 121.538 (1973). Tariff agreements give airlines the authority
to refuse to transport any person who might be inimical to safety of flight or who
refuses to consent to a search of his person or baggage. 49 U.S.C. § 1511 (1970).
2114 C.F.R. § 107.4 (1973).
22 Id.23 Department of Justice statistics, supra note 1. See also appendix to this
article.




II. CONSTrUTIONArI=Y OF PASSENGER SCREENING
UNDER PBE-JANUARY 5, 1973 PRocEDuRE
It is important to begin a study of the constitutionality of
search and seizure at today's airports with an examination of the
constitutionality of such searches and seizures under the pre-
January 5, 1973, screening procedures. The former procedures
are important for two reasons: first, there is much in the case law
covering pre-January 5, 1973, procedures which is valuable in
predicting how courts might decide search and seizure cases
under the current policies; and secondly, as will be discussed in
greater detail in Part IV of this article, even the F.A.A. admits
there is great likelihood of a return at some point to procedures
very much akin to those employed prior to February 16, 1973.26
A brief history of the implementation of the pre-January 5,
1973, pre-board passenger screening system is necessary at this
juncture." In February, 1969, the F.A.A. Administrator appointed
an eight-man task force to develop recommendations for dealing
with the skyjacking problem, since the number of incidents oc-
curring at that time was considered a serious aviation safety
problem. The task force, realizing that a federal statute already
authorized carriers to refuse passage to any person declining to
permit a search of his person or baggage, 2 decided that a system
whereby potentially dangerous passengers could be turned away
at the boarding gate would not result in legal problems from such
denial of passage. There was also the belief, however, that if a
potential hijacker were found, or if a person were discovered
carrying a weapon, he should not be turned loose without facing
criminal sanctions for his activities.
From their research, the task force developed the pre-board
passenger screening system which was in use until January of
1973. Basically, this so-called "Gate Plan" involved the following
criteria and steps prior to a "stop and frisk" and possible full-
fledged "search and seizure." First, signs were posted at the
boarding gates and at other strategic points around the airport,
warning passengers that "IT IS A FEDERAL CRIME TO: Carry
26 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 5, 1973, at 1, col. 5.2 7 The historical account is primarily based upon the writer's own knowledge
and contacts with F.A.A. officials.
2849 U.S.C. § 1511 (1970).
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Concealed Weapons Aboard Aircraft/Interfere with Flight
Crews." Further, the signs stated that "passengers and baggage
[are] subject to search under federal laws [and] F.A.A. Safety
regulations.... ." While the signs were probably not necessary to
uphold the constitutionality of the Gate Plan per se, they may
have provided a basis for an alternative argument of a consent
search to uphold the search's constitutionality.
The second aspect of the Gate Plan involved use of the "hi-
jacker profile." From psychological studies of hijackers conducted
by Dr. David Hubbard, a Dallas psychiatrist,29 and the F.A.A.
under the direction of its Chief Psychologist Dr. John T. Dailey,"
it was concluded that hijackers shared certain unique behavioral
traits. From these observed traits, a "profile" was developed to be
included in the anti-skyjacking system.3 A potential passenger
meeting all the criteria of the profile became a "selectee" under
the Gate Plan system.2
Selectees were thereafter processed through a magnetometer,
which was the third step under the Gate Plan.33 Since the mag-
netometer reacts to all sorts of metal products, including keys,
coins, and backbraces, it will be activated by approximately 50%
of all who come in contact with it." Under the Gate Plan only
selectees who activate the magnetometer would be detained fur-
ther, so only a small proportion of passengers would still have
been "hijacker prospects" after State Three was concluded. 35
Under this system, a selectee who activated the magnetometer
was normally asked to explain any metal on his person, to remove
such metal, and to resubmit to the magnetometer. He was also re-
29 See Perilous War on the Skyjacker, LmF, Aug. 11, 1972, at 26, 29.3 0 Interview with Dr. John T. Dailey, Chief Psychologist of the F.A.A., in
APaEY 99.
31 Id. at 98-103, 241. See also United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077,
1082-85, 1086-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
32 A.EY 240.33 A magnetometer is a device, which may be stationary or portable, which
measures the presence of ferrous metal "by sensing the deflections which the metal
causes in the earth's magnetic field." See AwEY 243-44, and McGinley and Downs,
Airport Searches and Seizures-A Reasonable Approach, 41 FORDHAM L. REv. 293,
303 (1972) [hereinafter cited as McGinley & Downs].
4 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1086 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
35 F.A.A. sampling indicated about 0.28% of all passengers screened were
selectees"; half of this number activated the magnetometer, so only 0.14% were




quired to produce adequate identification; and if he could not do
so nor adequately explain the ferrous metal on his person, the law
enforcement officer present would normally conduct a pat-down
search, akin to the "stop and fr'isk" described in Terry v. Ohio.36
This would be a limited search for weapons alone, based upon the
officer's reasonable suspicion that a crime had been or was being
committed. If this frisk gave rise to probable cause to believe a
crime was being or had been committed, a full-fledged search of
the person might thereafter be justified.
Under the voluntary screening procedures in effect prior to
January 5, 1973, alternate screening procedures were used at
some airports because of the unavailability of magnetometers or
because the nature and the destination of some flights (e.g., inter-
national flights) were thought to reduce the effectiveness of the
proffle. The Justice Department has consistently posited that only
the pure Gate Plan was objectively constitutional and sees each
of the alternate screening plans as a dilution of the safeguards
established under the Gate Plan, since each of the alternative
plans or procedures necessarily involves a greater degree of
emphasis on subjective determinations by airline employees or
law enforcement officials. Of course, it is undisputed that the
observation of airline employees, in addition to other known facts,
could evolve into a legal basis for a stop and frisk. But the De-
partment maintained that only under the Gate Plan could one be
certain of the constitutionality of a stop and frisk based upon the
plan itself.
Because of the use of these alternate screening procedures,
court decisions dealing with the search and seizure aspects of
pre-January 5, 1978, screening processes must be discussed in the
context of the type of screening procedures employed prior to
the search and seizure. Basically, the cases fall into three cate-
gories: (1) those searches conducted under the Gate Plan;
(2) those searches conducted under a plan employing only the
magnetometer, with or without other observable facts noted by
airline officials or law enforcement officers; and (3) searches based
38392 U.S. 1 (1968). It should be noted at this point that although the
Gate Plan, as heretofore described, involves several overlapping procedures, it con-
sists of three basic elements: (1) the profile; (2) the magnetometer activation; and
(3) the identification request.
1974]
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only upon the observation of law enforcement officials and other
known facts, the "pure Terry" category of airport searches.37
A. The Background: Terry v. Ohio28
It has long been the practice of law enforcement officers to
stop suspicious persons on the street or other public places in
order to question them and, as incidental to the "stop", to search
these people for dangerous weapons. Since this investigative
technique, known as "stop and frisk", would normally be em-
ployed when there would not be probable cause to search and
make an arrest, there were initially reservations about the con-
stitutionality of the "stop and frisk".
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.
The framers of the Bill of Rights clearly intended to favor the
use of search warrants when they drafted the fourth amendment.
Courts have generally held warrantless searches to be unreason-
able, subject to a few well-delineated exceptions. Typically,
searches at airports cannot meet the "exceptions" classification. 9
Since the airport search is almost always warrantless and does not
fall under one of the judicially-formulated exceptions to the fourth
amendments requirement of a search warrant, its constitutionality
must rest on the Terry rule (the "protective frisk for weapons")
or upon an interpretation of the phrase "unreasonable searches
and seizures" in the fourth amendment itself which would allow
classification of the warrantless airport search as reasonable. 40
z3 Class III cases are so designated since they involve direct and parallel ap-
plication of the Terry rationale to an airport setting without use of F.A.A.-
instituted, special screening procedures.38392 U.S. 1 (1968).
30 McGinley & Downs at 306. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)
(area "- Athin immediate control" of person arrested), and Schmerber v. Califormia,
384 U.S. 757 (1966) ("imminent destruction of evidence").40 McGinley & Downs at 806-07. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206(1960).
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In Terry, an experienced Cleveland police detective patrolling
the downtown Cleveland area became suspicious of two indi-
viduals who were walking up and down a street and continually
peering into a store window. The detective believed the men
were "casing a job, a stickup".4' He went across the street and
approached the individuals, in effect making a "stop." When the
men refused his request to furnish proper identification, the
detective, believing that at least one of the men must have had a
gun or other sort of weapon, grabbed the defendant Terry and
patted him down. During the pat-down, the detective felt a hard
object inside Terry's left breast pocket. He then conducted a
full-scale search of Terry which produced a revolver, and Terry
was arrested on a charge of carrying a concealed weapon. 42 Terry
was convicted and his conviction was upheld on appeal.48 He then
appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that because the detec-
tive had no probable cause for his search, the "fruits" of that illegal
search (viz., the revolver) should have been excluded from
evidence.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, though it spe-
cifically held that a stop and frisk was a search subject to fourth
amendment constraints. 44 Traditionally, of course, the require-
ment of probable cause had to be met in order to show that a
search was reasonable. In Terry the Court held that the detective
did not have probable cause for a search at the time of the pat-
down. However, a doctrine justifying the pat-down was enun-
ciated which provides that where a police officer has a "reasonable
suspicion" that a crime is being or may be committed and that the
person or persons with whom the officer is dealing "may be armed
and presently dangerous", 45 the policeman may make a "stop" to
investigate the matter further. If this "stop" and "encounter"
does not dispel the officer's fear for his safety and the safety of
others, he may then "... . conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him"4 -that is to say, the officer
41 392 U.S. at 6.
421d. at 7.
43214 N.E.2d 114 (Ohio 1966).
44392 U.S. at 31.




may "frisk" the subject. The Court rejected the notion that a
"mere hunch" would suffice to meet the reasonable suspicion test.
The officer must point to specific facts which allowed him, as a
reasonable person, to draw inferences that would justify the stop
and frisk.47 The Terry Court attempted to establish a three-fold
test to determine whether a stop and frisk was constitutional:
(1) " "... the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official
intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the
private citizen' . . . ."; (2) ". . . the nature and quality of the
intrusion on individual rights . . .;"4 and (3) the "articulable"
facts and reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts
which would lead the officer to believe that the suspect was
armed and therefore dangerous to the officer and to other citizens,
and had committed or was about to commit a criminal act.5" It
might be noted here that in the airport screening process the
elements included in the third phase of this test are usually com-
bined, since the relevant crimes would normally consist of at-
tempting to board an aircraft with a concealed weapon51 or will-
fully attempting to place a destructive substance on or in the
proximity of an aircraft with intent to damage, destroy, or disable
the aircraft.52 If either of these crimes is or may be committed,
the perpetrator would be "armed and dangerous."
B. The Cases Following Terry v. Ohio Which Applied Terry to
the Airport Screening Process..
1. Terry and the Gate Plan
United States v. Lopez53 provided the first opportunity for a
United States district court to apply the Teriy standards to the
airport screening process. The defendant had been designated
a selectee by airline officials, 4 who thereupon notified the United
47 Id. at 27. One need look no further than Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
(1968), decided the same day as Terry, to note the distinction between "reasonable
suspicion" and an inarticulable hunch.
48392 U.S. at 20-21, citing Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35
(1967).
49 392 U.S. at 24.
50 Id. at 27-28.
5149 U.S.C. § 1472(l) (1970).
52 18 U.S.C. § 32 (1970).
53 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
54 Id. at 1081. As used in this case a selectee was a passenger who (1) met
the criteria of the hijacker "profile", (2) activated the magnetometer, and (3)
failed, upon request, to provide airline olficials with proper identification. Under
the strict definition of the Gate Plan, a selectee is synonomous with one who meets(Continued on next page)
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States Marshals on duty. The marshals approached Lopez and
his companion, Ernesto Perez-Gonzalez, and requested that the
two walk through the magnetometer a second time. Each acti-
vated the magnetometer again; each failed to produce adequate
identification upon request. The marshals then removed both
travelers to a private area adjacent to the boarding gate and
frisked them for weapons. One of the law officers felt a hard
object, approximately four inches wide, six inches long, and
three inches deep, under Lopez' coat. The item turned out to be
a tinfoil-covered plastic envelope containing heroin. Lopez was
then arrested for a violation of 21 United States Code § § 178, 174,
"facilitating the transportation of heroin" and conspiracy to com-
mit that offense. 5 Lopez moved to suppress the heroin taken
from his person based upon the argument that since the search
which produced the heroin was unconstitutional, the fruits of that
illegal search should not be admissible into evidence.
Judge Weinstein ruled that the motion to suppress should be
granted on the ground that the airline company had "updated"
the F.A.A.-approved hijacker profile, eliminating one criterion
contained in the official profile and adding two others, one ethnic
and the other calling for an "act of individual judgment on the
part of airline employees [thereby] destroy[ing] the essential
neutrality and objectivity of the approved profile." 56 However,
Weinstein stated that, properly applied, the screening process
(including the F.A.A.-approved profile) in effect at J.F.K. Inter-
national Airport (basically what has been referred to previously
as the Gate Plan) was constitutional.57
Weinstein based his determination that the Gate Plan was
constitutional on Terry and its companion case, Sibron v. New
York. 5" A protective weapons search such as the one conducted
in Lopez must be based upon the reasonable suspicion that a
crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed, and that
the suspect presents a danger to the officer or to persons in the
vicinity.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
all criteria of the hijacker profile, and that alone. When the term "selectee" is
otherwise used in this article, it will refer to a passenger who meets the hijacker
"profile."
55 328 F. Supp. at 1081-82.
50 Id. at 1101.
57 Id. at 1099.
us392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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The obvious ambiguity in the Terry and Lopez test centers
around the words "reasonable suspicion"; that is, at what point
should a law enforcement officer be reasonably suspicious such
that a protective frisk for weapons could be constitutionally per-
missible? Weinstein stated, first, that the "stop" must be sepa-
rated from the "frisk" in answering this question-the level of
suspcion necessary is lower with respect to the stop than with
respect to the frisk. 9 He went on to declare that the level of proba-
bility necessary to sustain the reasonableness of suspicion lead-
ing to a frisk cannot be stated precisely in any mathematical
formula, but "... depends upon balancing the degree of incursion
into the individual's privacy against the society's interest in the
intrusion at the particular moment as perceived from the then
known facts . 6... 
The factors involved in this balancing test are vital. Weinstein
listed a few: (1) seriousness of the offense; (2) necessity of con-
ducting the investigation; (3) locale involved; (4) suspect's activi-
ties; (5) danger to the public if immediate action is not taken;
(6) nature and length of detection; (7) harm to the suspect; (8)
degree of community resentment aroused by particular practices;
and (9) the manner in which the frisk is conducted.6' One
should note that throughout the discussion Weinstein assumed
that a suspect existed; that is, one whom the law enforcement
officer reasonably believed to be suspicious. In the airport setting,
he indicated that the Gate Plan not only fixes suspicion, but also
provides the reasonable suspicion for both the stop and the frisk.
Naturally enough, under this formula, the level of suspicion
necessary is lowered as the societal interest in the search increases.
However, the social interest is never so great as to lower the level
of suspicion to zero. But Weinstein stated that the level of prob-
ability that a crime is being or is about to be committed may
need be only 5% to justify a stop and frisk "[i]f ... government
officers have information indicating that a bomb is being taken
aboard an airplane. ... -6' This statement will become more
important when discussing the constitutionality of the current
screening techniques, which relate to reasonable suspicion or
59 328 F. Supp. at 1094.
60 Id., citing Terry v. Ohio, 892 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968).
61 Id.
62 Id. at 1095.
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probability of criminal activity only in the most abstract way
-that is, the mere fact that the search is conducted within
the confines of an airport. In Lopez, Weinstein held that
the screening system itself provides the sufficient probability
quotient to justify the protective frisk for weapons so long as it
is properly administered. This result was partially reached on
the ground that a lower probability of impending criminal activity
is required for a stop and frisk as opposed to an arrest since the
later requires probable cause,63 whereas the former requires
only reasonable suspicion of impending criminal activity. It was
also based upon the relative certainty provided by the system's
statistical performance. Weinstein stated that not only is the
potential danger from a hijacker great enough to justify a search
where only 6% of those searched are found to carry weapons,
but he also pointed out there will be minimal inconvenience to
the traveling public since only 0.1% of all passengers screened
are frisked and that in this 0.1% are "practically all of the po-
tential hijackers." 4 It is clear, and Weinstein was quick to recog-
nize the fact, that "[in]ere statistical information... does not, by
itself, justify 'frisks'."65 Otherwise, anyone traveling in geographi-
cal areas of high crime would be subject to a frisk, and "[s]uch
harassment by police without more objective evidence of criminal
activity or a legitimate investigative purpose is proscribed by the
fourth amendment." 6
Finally, Weinstein held in Lopez that the seizure of the heroin
would have been justified even though Terry authorizes only a pat-
down search for weapons. As long as the search is conducted in
good faith and is limited in scope to a search for weapons, "[t]he
officer need not close his eyes to evidence of other crimes which
he may uncover."67 Weinstein believes that since the anti-hijack-
ing system is designed to deter air piracy and related offenses, it
is not damned as a mere ruse to seize narcotics. 68 The court con-
cluded that the profile gives a sufficient basis to focus attention
63 Id. at 1096; see Henldn, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HAMy. L. REv.
63, 184 (1968).64 328 F. Supp. at 1097.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1097-98.
67 Id. at 1098. See also LaFave, 'Street Encounters' and the Constitution;
Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MicH. L. Rmv. 40, 91-93 (1968).
68 328 F. Supp. at 1099.
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on a particular subject and, via the magnetometer, test him fur-
ther. The questions of the constitutionality of a magnetometer
search without a profile warning and constitutionality of a frisk
based only on a magnetometer's positive reading were specifically
reserved by Judge Weinstein. 69
Another case, United States v. Bell, 71 involved the straight-
forward application of the F.A.A.-approved Gate Plan. Defendant
Bell met the criteria of the profile and his ticket was marked by
the airline ticket agent in a manner to alert the gate attendant
that Bell was a selectee. Upon notification the attendant sum-
moned a deputy U.S. marshal. Bell arrived at the boarding gate
and activated the magnetometer as he passed through it. The
marshal asked Bell to walk through the magnetometer again,
which he did, with the same result. Bell was then asked to
produce identification and he responded that he had just been
released from state prison and was out on bail for attempted
murder and narcotics charges. The marshal asked him whether
he would mind being patted down and Bell replied that he
would not mind. Bell was patted down and hard objects, about
four to five inches long, were felt in his raincoat. Upon request
of the marshals, Bell removed one of the objects, which turned
out to be a brown paper bag. Fearing that the bag contained
explosives, the marshal asked Bell to open it. Upon further in-
vestigation, the bag was found to have enclosed glassine envelopes
containing heroin.
In upholding the constitutionality of the search, and therefore
the admissibility of the heroin into evidence, the Second Circuit
panel upheld the constitutionality of the Gate Plan and the
marshal's actions under it. The magnetometer search and the
stop and frisk were viewed as falling completely within the Terry
test of reasonable suspicion.7 1 Further, the scope of the search
was held to be reasonable on the ground that explosives might
well have been contained in the paper bag which Bell removed
from inside his coat pocket.7 2
60 Those issues are discussed in United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 947 (1972). See text ccompanying note 79infra.i o464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1973).
71 Id. at 673.
72 Judge Friendly, in a concurring opinion, stated that since the hijacking
(continued on next page)
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A U.S. Court of Appeals again upheld the constitutionality
of the Gate Plan in United States v. Slocum." In this case the
pat-down frisk produced neither weapons nor explosives, so the
marshal inspected Slocum's carry-on luggage and discovered a
rolled-up sock concealing what the marshal believed was a
"definite foreign substance. ' 74 The marshal asked Slocum to
unroll the sock. Slocum refused, and the marshall, suspecting
the sock might contain explosives, opened the sock and found
what proved later to be 181 grams of cocaine."
United States v. Edmunds" also involved the use of the Gate
Plan and an ultimate search of the defendant which uncovered
heroin. Judge Dooling held that the search was constitutional,
citing Lopez. The opinion stated:
[There is no] ... evidence that could support an inference
that [the] .. .defendant was subjected to a procedure that
was not strictly related to safety in flight considerations and
rationally related to their assurance. There is no intimation
that ... [the defendant was] actually searched because ...
[he] looked like... [a] drug courier, or because a pocket of
each man bulged with something that might be contraband
but was not a weapon. 77
As we shall see later, judge Dooling believes the fourth amend-
ment is inapplicable in the anti-hijacking context, which he seem-
ingly regards as one of aviation security rather than crime de-
tection.78
2. The Magnetometer Alone: United States v. Epperson79
Epperson is important for at least two reasons: first, it deals
directly with the constitutionality of the magnetometer search per
se; and second, it considers the constitutionality of the stop and
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
threat jeopardizes lives and property, this danger alone meets the test of reasonable-
ness under Terry. Id. at 675 (Friendly, J., concurring). However, Judge Mansfield
also wrote a concurring opinion in which he took issue with Judge Friendly's re-
marks. Id. at 675-76 (Mansfield, J., concurring).
73 464 F.2d 1180 (3rd Cir. 1972).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 No. 71 CR 251 (E.D.N.Y., Jan. 24, 1972) (Dooling, J., presiding).
77 Id. at 13 of filed opinion.
78 See United States v. Mitchell, 352 F. Supp. 38, 42 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), dis-
cussed in text following note 90 infra.
79 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
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frisk without benefit of the hijacker profile-that is, a search based
solely upon a positive magnetometer reading.
The Fourth Circuit began by holding that the use of the
magnetometer itself constitutes a search under the fourth amend-
ment.80 The court went on to state, however, that the magneto-
meter search was reasonable under fourth amendment standards.
"We think the search for the sole purpose of discovering weapons
and preventing air piracy, and not for the purpose of discovering
weapons and pre-criminal events, fully justified the minimal
invasion of personal privacy by magnetometer."81 Thus, the court
concluded that because the magnetometer's "invasion" is minimal,
its use is "reasonable" under fourth amendment standards. As to
the reasonableness of the subsequent frisk which uncovered the
weapon by which Epperson was charged with a violation of 49
United States Code § 1472(l), -82 the Fourth Circuit panel con-
cluded that the frisk was reasonable because the marshal feared for
his safety and the safety of others due to the possibility (later
proved a reality) of a weapon on the person of Epperson.'
The extent to which Epperson affects Lopez may not be im-
mediately clear, but it is the contention here that its effect is far-
reaching, and it was so perceived at the Department of Justice
following the Epperson decision. Judge Weinstein in Lopez had
established, first, that the warning given by the profile, indicating
"... a need to focus particular attention on the subject.. ."2 likely
made the magnetometer's intrusion unobjectionable. 4 Although
Weinstein was not called upon to decide the validity of the
magnetometer search absent the profile and specifically stated
that he was not deciding the magnetometer's validity standing
alone, his statement indicates his doubt that the magnetometer
search is constitutional without the initial warning from use of a
profile. This is also evident from Weinstein's numerous references
to the Gate Plan as a package and from his contention that each
aspect of the Plan was necessary to lead to the ultimate "reason-
able suspicion" required to justify the frisk under Terry stan-
so Id. at 770.
81 Id. at 771.
82 Attempting to Board or Boarding an Aircraft with a Concealed Deadly or




dards. It should again be noted that because the airline in Lopez
did not apply the F.A.A.-approved profile, the ultimate frisk was
held to be unconstitutional. Had Weinstein so desired, he could
well have held that the misuse of the profile was immaterial and
upheld the frisk on the bases of the magnetometer activation and
failure to secure proper identification from Lopez. This he spe-
cifically refused to do. As previously noted, the Department of
Justice continued to have doubts about the validity of Epperson
even after certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court. Indeed,
in statements which this writer helped prepare, the Department
continued to hold firm to its thesis that only the Gate Plan was
constitutional even after Epperson was decided.
One would be remiss not to state that in both the Bell 5 and
Slocums°' decisions, discussed above, the Second and Third Cir-
cuits, respectively, followed Epperson even though in each case
the Gate Plan had been in effect and therefore the proffle had
preceded the use of the magnetometer. Both courts upheld the
constitutionality of the magnetometer search per se, and also the
subsequent frisk based upon the magnetometer, and, in Slocum,
upon the defendant's failure to produce proper identification.
There is little doubt that the Epperson opinion strengthens
the hand of law enforcement officials; further, there is little doubt
that the Second and Third Circuits have followed the Fourth
Circuit's lead in Epperson. Although in United State v. Albar-
ado8 ' 5 a panel of the Second Circuit held that a frisk of the person
after an initial positive magnetometer reading would be per-
missible only after the passenger was allowed to remove all metal
from his person, passed through that manetometer a second time,
and again activated the magnetometer"6"10 Whether Lopez, the
landmark decision in the area of airport searches, would naturally
lead to a result such as that obtained in Epperson is indeed another
matter. Finally, whether Judge Weinstein would agree with the
Epperson court's assertion that the ultimate search, based on a pos-
itive magnetometer reading alone, ". . . is more than reasonable; it
85 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1973).
80 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972).
86.05 42 U.S.L.W. 2557-58 (2d Gir. April 4, 1970).
86.10 See also United States v. Dalpiaz, 494 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1974),
where a positive magnetometer reading plus other articulable facts to which the
law enforcement officer could point validated the subsequent search and seizure.
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is a compelling necessity..."s is at best doubtful, especially when
normally 50% of all enplaning passengers will activate the mag-
netometer.8 8 Indeed, the district court opinion in Bell specifically
expressed reservations on just this point; however, the court over-
rode its fears by stating that the magnetometer is really a screening
device and a deterrent to air piracy more than it is a detection
device.89 The F.A.A., in conversations with this writer, concurred
with this observation by the District Court in Bell, seeing the
magnetometer primarily as a device to clear passengers rather
than to detect wrongdoers.
3. The Magnetometer Plus Observed Conduct:
United States v. MitchelP
Mitchell parallels Lopez in that the issue in both cases was
the constitutionality of a stop and frisk where misapplication
of the profile led to the designation of the passenger as a selectee
in a standard Gate Plan procedure. In Lopez, the misapplication
of the profile (and thus the possible wrongful classification of
Lopez as a selectee) was held to be fatal to the constitutionality
of the subsequent stop and frisk, though Judge Weinstein held
that the system, if properly applied, was constitutional. In Mitch-
ell, however, Judge Dooling upheld the ultimate search even
though it was in part based on Mitchell's improper designation
as a selectee. The differences between Mitchell, decided after
Epperson, and Lopez, decided prior to Epperson, are important
as well as somewhat disturbing.
As to the constitutionality of the magnetometer search per se,
Judge Dooling stated that "[alirport 'search' cases hardly invoke
Fourth Amendment standards,"91 because they serve the purpose
of assuring the safe passage "of private persons on privately owned
aircraft" 92 and not the detection of crime. Therefore, the mag-
netometer search is not a device used to establish probable cause
for a full-fledged search but is rather a screening device "adopted
as a convenient substitute for the total search of all passengers."93
87 454 F.2d at 772.
88 See 328 F. Supp. at 1086.
89 335 F. Supp. 797, 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
903 52 F. Supp. 38 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
91 Id. at 42.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 43.
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It is obvious from the foregoing argument that Dooling ex-
cepts the airport search from fourth amendment standards be-
cause he believes that the screening process occurs between one
private individual (the airline company) and another private
individual (the prospective passenger). Indeed, Dooling states
in dictum that the profile and magnetometer are not constitu-
tionally required but rather were devised for the convenience of
air passengers. "The profile and magnetometer except most
passengers from the total search that common sense otherwise
requires and that air safety really recommends....-94
As long as the ultimate search is designed to prevent air
piracy and thus protect the traveling public, Dooling contends
that it, too, is protected. In this particular case, the officers dis-
covered a knife in Mitchell's carry-on baggage which could well
have accounted for the magnetometer reading, but the officers
continued to search the baggage and discovered the heroin, the
possession of which was the basis for the criminal charge against
Mitchell. The search which produced the narcotics was upheld
on the ground that the further search was also carried out for the
purpose of prevention of air piracy or other destructive acts.
"[The officers] were free to complete the search since, in popular
report and public suspicion, the hijack threat includes not simply
conventional weapons but bomb threats and other alternatives
to the conventional pistol or grenade."95
Clearly Judge Dooling has expanded the doctrine of Lopez in
this decision. No longer need the profile serve as a kind of
probable cause which justifies a close look at a selectee's mag-
netometer reading. Further, the ultimate search will be upheld
as long as the search is for the purpose of prevention of air
piracy or related acts. Finally, the burden of demonstrating that
the ultimate search was not for the suppression of air piracy is
placed upon the defendant. 6 Thus, there is a near presumption
of the ultimate search's constitutionality, which is rebuttable
only if the defendant can prove that the search was not carried
out for the purpose of prevention of air piracy and to protect
fellow air passengers. The difficulty of such negative proof is
04Id. (emphasis supplied).
95 Id. at 44.
96 Id. at 43-44.
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especially acute in an airport search case where the defendant
has so few details available to him regarding the operation of the
screening system. Indeed, it appears that Judge Dooling has
established a rule in Mitchell that would allow practically any
search of enplaning passengers and the introduction of the fruits
of that search into evidence, based on his conception of the
dangers to the public (i.e., the societal interest in the search) in
the airport context. Dooling's favorable citation of Judge Friend-
lys concurring opinion in Bell lends weight to this thesis. 7 This
view surely leads to a grave dilution of the protections granted
by the fourth amendment to the American people, and could, it
appears, lead to the result which Judge Weinstein in Lopez
specifically rejected: a search based upon "mere statistical in-
formation", or, worse yet, no statistical information at all." For
Weinstein, the screening system, properly applied, led to the
necessary prerequisite of "reasonable suspicion" for a frisk as
required by Terry. It is submitted that Dooling has completely
eroded the Weinstein safeguard; and for the reasons stated above,
it is further submitted that Dooling's test should be rejected.
4. Decisions Not Testing the Constitutionality
of the Anti-Hijacking System: "Pure Terry" Cases
United States v. Lindsey"9 was the first appellate case to test
the constitutionality of an airport search outside the context of
the F.A.A. anti-hijacking screening program. Defendant Lindsey
rushed into the boarding lounge of Eastern Airlines Flight 427,
handed his ticket to the agent on duty and told him to "save a
seat for Williams." However, the ticket was in the name of
"James Marshall" and noting this, the agent indicated to Jack
Brophy, the Deputy United States Marshal assigned to monitor
Flight 427, that the defendant should be watched. 00 Brophy
observed that the "defendant appeared nervous and was looking
about and 'perspiring' "-.1 When the time for boarding arrived
and the defendant moved towards the plane, Brophy approached
him, identified himself, and asked Lindsey to return the favor.
971d. at 43.
98 328 F. Supp. at 1097. See text accompanying notes 65-66 supra.
99 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972).
100 Id. at 702.
101 Id. at 703.
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Lindsey produced a selective service card bearing the name
"Melvin Giles." Brophy stated that the defendant's nervousness
increased at this point. The defendant also showed the marshal
a social security card with his proper name, "Bobby R. Lindsey."
In the process of attempting to ascertain the defendant's
identity, Brophy noticed two large bulges in Lindsey's coat pocket.
He feared these bulges might in fact be weapons and patted
down the defendant. The bulges were "very solid" and Brophy
extracted the items, which proved to be aluminum-covered
packages containing heroin.
10 2
Applying Terry to the facts of this case, the Third Circuit
panel upheld the search's constitutionality. The level of suspicion
was found to have been lower than that in Terry, but given the
inherent dangers in the hijacking context and the limited time
within which Brophy had to act, the court ruled that the required
level of suspicion should be less than that required in Terry.
Given this "lower probability of danger" requirement, the actual
probability in this case was sufficient to meet this lowered standard
of reasonable suspicion. °3 The court gives no assistance in de-
fining this lowered level of suspicion, but as Terry did a rather
poor job of defining reasonable suspicion itself, little is lost be-
cause of Lindsey's impreciseness. 101 To assert that the gloss
Lindsey places upon Terry is considerable is not an understate-
ment; however, as the Third Circuit noted, the Terry level of
suspicion had already been lowered in contexts other than air
piracy.10 5 The remaining problem is, of course, one of predict-
ability in the criminal law. Perhaps predictability in this area is
too much to expect-so much depends upon the particular factual
situation. Weinstein stated in Lopez that there might be situ-
ations where only a 5% probability in the officer's mind that
crime was afoot or that the subject was armed and dangerous
would suffice to justify a stop and frisk under the reasonable
suspicion test. 06 Just what level of probability would be required
in order that the Lindsey court would allow a stop and frisk in
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Note Weinstein's considerable difflculty with the Terry "probabilities test"
in Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
105 451 F.2d at 704.
100 328 F. Supp. at 1095. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
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the airport context is unknown; we do know that, somehow, the
officer's suspicion can be somewhat less reasonable to justify
the search at the airport than that required in the Terry context.
Another recent case which upheld an airport search on a
"pure Terry" basis is United States v. Moreno.1°7 There, actions
of the defendant had made the officer who was to eventually
search Moreno quite suspicious. Although the defendant's phy-
sical appearance here was much akin to Lindsey's, it appears the
law enforcement officer had more objective factors to point to
than did Marshal Brophy in Lindsey-for example, Moreno con-
tinually switched from one Braniff ticket line to another, was
"obviously nervous", and subsequently went to Southwest Air-
lines to purchase his ticket. Further, the officer noticed a bulge
in Moreno's coat early in his observation of the defendant.10
Finally, after officer Granados approached Moreno and began to
question him, he discovered rash inconsistencies between what
Moreno was telling him and what Granados knew to be the truth
regarding the defendant's prior conduct. Only when Moreno
started to turn away from Granados did the officer remove the
defendant from the immediate area to conduct first a further
investigation and then a search of defendant's coat,109 which
eventually turned up the heroin, the possession of which was
the subject of the criminal charge lodged against Moreno.
In upholding the constitutionality of the search, the court
stated that the case before it was controlled by Terry and sub-
sequent cases applying Terry in the context of an airport search."'
While the court admitted that the then-current air piracy problem
was critical, it rejected the notion that this "sheer urgency" could
justify a warrantless search. However, the court stated that be-
cause officer Granados had objective fact to point to which
buttressed his reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot
and because the possible danger to the officer and others was appar-
ent from any review of hijacking or attempted hijacking incidents,
the ultimate search was constitutional."'
107 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 840 (1973). The case was
fo~lowed by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th
Cir. 1973).
108 475 F.2d at 45-46.
109 Id. at 46.
l Id. at 46-47.
3 "1Id. at 47-50.
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Although the court purported to decide the case before it on
the basis of Terry, and although the Terry level of suspicion ap-
plied to the Moreno facts would likely have justified the search
without a Lindsey lowering of that level of suspicion, the Fifth
Circuit purported to apply "special fourth amendment con-
siderations" to the airport "zone," analogizing to the border
crossing zone, where special rules have always applied to searches
by customs officers." 2 However, the court specifically rejected
the idea of applying the so-called "mere suspicion" test for border
crossing searches to airport searches; thus, the court continued to
apply the Terry test of "reasonable suspicion".113
It should be noted that officer Granados never patted Moreno
down, but rather searched Moreno's coat thoroughly after Moreno
removed it upon request. The court had no difficulty sustaining
the search without the precedent pat-down frisk, even though
Terry authorized only a limited pat-down frisk for weapons. The
panel stated:
In applying Terry were we to hold that airport security officials
must always confine themselves to a "pat down" search where
there is a proper basis for an air piracy investigation, we think
that such a per se restriction in the final analysis would be self-
defeating. . . . [The] hijacker can conceal explosives or
weapons in places which might be overlooked in the course of
a cursory pat down.1 4
This statement is troublesome for at least two reasons: first, if one
really "applies Terry", as the panel stated it was doing, then only
a pat-down could conceivably be authorized initially. Secondly,
while it is of course true that the pat-down or other circumstances
(e.g., an arrest for a criminal act followed by a "full" search inci-
dent to that arrest) could lead to the probable cause necessary
for a full-fledged search, such was not the case here, since no pat-
down was effected. If the court is arguing, however ineffectually,
that the clear bulge showing in Moreno's coat pocket made a
precedent frisk superfluous, problems still arise, since the bulge
might not be a hard substance at all but (for example) a large,
rolled-up handkerchief. The purpose of the frisk is to determine
112 Id. at 51.
113Id. n.8.
314 Id. at 51.
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whether there are weapons on the person of the individual which
are dangerous to the officer or others in the vicinity. It is sub-
mitted that the Moreno decision as it relates to the full-fledged
search is simply wrong. The court cannot rationally apply Terry
and reach the result it did. Finally, while allowing a full-fledged
search is surely proper after a pat-down has raised a reasonable
suspicion to the level of probable cause, in Moreno there was no
probable cause for the search that occurred.
5. The Dissents: Kroll,"5 Meulener;116 and Ruiz-Estrella"
We have been discussing the federal court decisions which
have upheld searches at airports under the pre-1973 screening
procedures, procedures which may soon again be in force, al-
beit in a somewhat modified form. Lest we leave this area with
the mistaken belief that the courts uniformly uphold the con-
stitutionality of airport searches so conducted, we should examine
three cases which held that the searches conducted were uncon-
stitutional, though these three cases arguably drive a very small
wedge into the otherwise solid front the courts have presented.
The first, United States v. Kroll,"8 can be dealt with rather
summarily. The case involved the application of an apparently
modified Gate Plan." 9 After activating the metal detector, the
defendant was asked to submit his attache case to a search prior
to a determination of whether anything on his person might have
triggered the device. A Deputy United States Marshal was ob-
serving the TWA agent during the search of the attach6 case and
became suspicious when the defendant did not open the file
section of the case. Upon asking the defendant to do this and
observing an envelope in the file section, the marshal directed the
defendant to open the envelope and deposit the contents into the
case. He based his action upon what he referred to as defendant's
"suspicious" behavior. The envelope proved to have contained
"15 United States v. Kroll, 351 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Mo. 1972). On July 10,
1973 the decision was upheld on appeal by the Eighth Circuit, 481 F.2d 884 (8thCir. 1973).116 United States v. Meulener, 851 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972), currently
on appeal before a Ninth Circuit panel.
117 United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973).
118 351 F. Supp. 148 (w.D. Mo. 1972).
119 Seemingly, the selectee was requested to furnish suitable identification prior
to activating the magnetometer rather than after activation. 351 F. Supp. at 150.
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the amphetamine which was the subject of the criminal charge
lodged against the defendant.120
While upholding the constitutionality of general anti-hijacking
procedures as applied in the instant situation, the court held the
scope of the search overly broad and therefore unconstitutional.
"... [T]he Marshal was not searching ... for weapons of any
kind which could be used to hijack the plane but was searching
for contraband. ... . In short, the court found no reasonable
basis for a suspicion on the part of the marshal that the envelope
could contain a weapon or a destructive substance. 22
From the standpoint of anti-hijacking procedures at our na-
tion's airports, the most important thesis to be taken from Kroll
is the court's approval of a limited inspection of carry-on baggage
for weapons or explosives, given the reasonable suspicion of an
officer aroused by a suspect meeting the criteria of the Gate Plan.
The major difficulty with the court's position is the fact that the
defendant did produce proper identification when identification
was requested, and under a strict interpretation of the Gate Plan,
he should have been allowed to board the plane. It is true that
a selectee activating the magnetometer might be constitutionally
frisked even if he could produce proper identification, but it
appears there would then be required other objective factors an
officer could point to in order to meet the test of "reasonable
suspicion". Here, all the officer could demonstrate was a 'hunch"
-he stated that the defendant acted "suspiciously"-and whether
such a "hunch" added to the positive magnetometer reading 23
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 The Court, however, added a caveat:
It should be noted that this opinion is based on the present state of the
art of miniaturization of dangerous explosive devices, based on all the in-
formation possible to secure at this time. It is entirely conceivable that
miniaturized explosives of sufficient force to constitute a threat to an air-
craft could in the future, be developed to a degree that may invalidate
the principles expressed herein.
351 F. Supp. at 155 n.3.
At another point in the opinion the court mentioned that the incident took
place prior to the increased use of the so-called "plastic explosive letters", Id. at
150, thus perhaps implying that the state of the art is now such as might justify
a search of an envelope in a situation similar to the one described in Kroll. How-
ever, the court also stated that the particular envelope searched here could not
have been one of the "plastic explosive letters." Id.




and the defendant's selectee status meets the Terry test is at
least questionable. 24 Clearly, mere suspicion would never be
grounds for a frisk, and, under Weinstein's thesis in Lopez,
neither would "two-thirds" of a Gate Plan. Whether the two
factors in combination are grounds for a stop and frisk, much
less a full search (as was the case here) prior to any pat-down
of the defendant's person, is doubtful. In effect, the court answers
the above question negatively when it specifically states that it
would never find constitutional an unlimited search of a passen-
ger's baggage at the inception of the anti-hijacking procedures.' 5
Here, in effect, the marshal conducted an unlimited search of
the attache case since nothing about the envelope could con-
ceivably constitute an air piracy threat. 26
The second case to depart from the line of cases upholding
searches and seizures at airports is United States v. Meulener.127
This case may represent a more serious attack on the Lopez line
of cases than does Kroll. The district court in Meulener granted
the defendant's suppression motion on dual grounds: first, that
the marshal deviated from the established procedures in that he
conducted a full-scale search of the defendant, a selectee who
activated the metal detector, rather than first conducting a
limited search for weapons; and secondly, that Meulener was not
given an opportunity to decline to be searched on condition that
he not board the plane.
The first ground, deviation from established procedures and
conducting a full-scale search without a precedent pat-down frisk,
has been discussed earlier in connection with criticism of the
Moreno2 ' and Kroll. 9 decisions. The marshal was operating
under a "2/ Gate Plan"-the profile and magnetometer were
utilized, but no request for identification was ever made. Further,
instead of merely frisking the subject to try to determine what
was causing the positive magnetometer reading, the marshal
made a full search of the passenger's suitcase, which produced
124 See also People v. Superior Court, 478 P.2d 449 (1970), 91 Cal. Rptr. 729
(1970); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67 (1968).
125 351 F. Supp. at 152.
126 Id. at 153.
127 351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
128 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 840 (1973).
129 351 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
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the narcotics sought to be introduced at trial by the government. 8 '
As the court correctly stated, there was no probable cause to
arrest Meulener at the time he attempted to board the aircraft,
so the search could not be justified as one incident to a lawful
arrest; it had to stand or fall on Terry criteria, and it fell. Terry
allows only a limited frisk for weapons based on the reasonable
suspicion standard, and while the frisk may lead to probable
cause for a full search, Terry does not authorize a full search
based merely on reasonable suspicion. Here, the selectee status
of Meulener and the activation of the magnetometer gave rise, if
anything, to only a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
might be forthcoming, thus justifying only a limited pat-down.
It should also be noted once more that no identification request
was made of the defendant, a requirement under Gate Plan pro-
cedures prior to a frisk.13' To reiterate, other objective factors,
when added to selectee status and a positive magnetometer
reading, might obviate the necessity of an identification check or,
indeed, might permit a frisk even if proper identification is pro-
duced. 32 In Meulener none of these "other factors" were present.
The court might well have based its decision on this ground,
but it went further and stated that the defendant should have
been given the right to decline to be searched upon pain of not
being allowed to board the aircraft, and since this choice was
not offered, the search was constitutionally defective. The court's
rationale for this position was that the governmental interest
justifying the search is nonexistent when the individual concerned
does not board the aircraft. 33 However, the court neglected to
consider the possible crimes of (1) attempting to board an air-
craft with a concealed deadly or dangerous weapon, 134 and (2)
attempting to place destructive devices upon an aircraft. 33 Gov-
ernmental interest in preventing these crimes, surely related to
air piracy, is not specious and can justify a frisk of the suspect.
As stated previously, airline companies already have the power, by
130 351 F. Supp. at 1286.
13' 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1288. See also United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp.
1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
132 Examples are the ubiquitous "bulge" in a suspect's clothing and the
suspect's behavior. See United States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971).
133 351 F. Supp. at 1289.
13449 U.S.C. § 1472(l) (1970).
135 18 U.S.C. § 32 (1970).
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statute and under F.A.A. regulations, to deny passage to anyone
appearing inimical to the safety of a particular flight.' But the
federal government's interest goes beyond merely turning away
prospective troublemakers at the ramp gate. Part of that interest
relates to the fact that, after being turned away from one airline,
the prospective hijacker may wind up at another airline or at an-
other airport. The statutes mentioned above are an integral part of
the anti-hijacking program, for the reasons just stated. It would
appear that their possible violation could well justify a limited
frisk for weapons or destructive devices based on the reasonable
suspicion of a law enforcement officer. Thus, it is this writer's
opinion that the Meulener court was incorrect when it stated
that there is no remaining governmental interest in a search if
the prospective passenger declines to board the aircraft.137
The scope issue has already been dealt with, at least tan-
gentially, in the preceding discussion of Meulener. Suffice it to
state that the Meulener court held there was no justification for
a search of the luggage at the inception of the screening procedure
because no frisk of the subject's person had been effectuated and
also because the subject had not been asked to explain the pres-
ence of metal which could have activated the magnetometer.
The third case to deviate from the general line of cases up-
holding searches at airports, United States v. Ruiz-Estrella,3 8 in-
volved a search based only upon the selectee status of the de-
fendant. Ruiz had his shopping bag searched by a federal sky
marshal, a customs officer, after the marshal was unsatisfied with
selectee Ruiz' attempt to produce adequate identification. Inside
the bag a shotgun and shells were discovered, which constituted
the basis for the charge against Ruiz.13 However, the search was
really based only upon the profile, since the officer testified
that he would have searched Ruiz regardless of whether he had
produced proper identification. The court distinguished Ruiz
from Lopez and Bell on its facts and held that the search was
unconstitutional. 40 The court emphasized that Ruiz never passed
13649 U.S.C. § 1511 (1970).
'37 See also United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973); and
United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973), both of which refuse to
follow Meulener on this point.
138 481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973).
139 Ruiz was charged with a violation of 49 U.S.C. § 1472(l) (1970).
140 481 F.2d at 730.
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through a magnetometer and did nothing at all which could be
construed as suspicious in nature. 41 The panel simply would
not justify a search based solely upon the selectee status of the
subject. The court refused to decide whether a frisk of a pas-
senger can be justified solely through use of the magnetometer,
or whether the use of the Gate Plan satisfies the Terry stan-
dard of reasonable suspicion, but indicated that the Epperson
situation (and thus by implication the Gate Plan, which adds the
profile and identification request requirements to Epperson's sole
requirement of an activated magnetometer) is far more com-
pelling in justifying a resultant frisk. 42 It would appear, there-
fore, that this court would have upheld a search based upon the
Gate Plan or upon some articulable facts in addition to the mere
selectee status of the defendant.
In this brief examination of cases relating to pre-January 1973
screening procedures, we have seen that most courts uphold the
constitutionality of searches at airports based upon those screen-
ing procedures, or a part of them, or upon observable factors to
which law officers could point at trial, the so-called "pure Terry"
cases. Only Meulener is at any real odds with the great line of
decisions on this subject, and it is itself subject to question with
regard to the breadth of its holding and especially its finding
that there is no governmental interest in the search of a non-
boarding suspect. With this background, we shall now turn to
the question of the constitutionality of the current airport screen-
ing procedures.
III. CoNsrrrTuoNALrrY OF CURRENT (PosT-JANuARY 1978)
SCEEIMNG PROCEDMUES
A. Description of the Current Screening System
The year during which this writer was a member of the Inter-
agency Committee on Air Transportation Security afforded him
many contacts with F.A.A. officials. It was commonly stated dur-
ing that period that if every enplaning passenger could be fully
searched, then one would reasonably be assured of putting an
end to air piracy. However, it was felt that the legal and practical
problems inherent in such a solution to the problem of skyjacking
141 Id. at 729.
142 Id.
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were so immense as to make this solution untenable. Ironically,
the system currently in effect is a slightly modified version of the
utopian solution just described as "untenable" by the F.A.A.
Under the current procedures, all enplaning passengers are
screened either immediately prior to boarding an aircraft or as
they enter a secure or "sterile" area. Such a sterile area must be
established whenever predeparture screening is accomplished at
locations other than boarding gates. With the crush of passengers
in a small area such as a boarding gate immediately prior to
take-off, most airlines have established screening areas which
lead to all gates at which that airline will be enplaning passengers.
Beyond the screening area is the sterile area, and everyone desir-
ing to enter a sterile area must therefore be screened prior to
entrance. It is the F.A.A.'s recommendation that passengers
and visitors should be segregated such that visitors are not allowed
access to sterile areas; should visitors be permitted to enter sterile
areas, they must of course be screened. Further, anyone leaving
a sterile area must be rescreened upon reentry.
The screening procedure itself is somewhat flexible. Screening
must include at least inspection of all baggage and other carry-on
items in the possession of passengers or visitors. Each person must
also be subjected to a detection device (i.e. a magnetometer).143
Each airport operater was required to amend the master security
plan submitted to the F.A.A. in 1972144 to ensure that at least one
law enforcement officer is present during the entire pre-board
screening process heretofore described. Air carrier personnel do
all the routine pre-board processing of passengers. They inspect
the carry-on bags (either physically or with x-ray machines) and
operate the magnetometer. The law enforcement officer has a
backup role. If something unusual is discovered, or a passenger
cannot be cleared by the metal detector, or if a passenger attempts
to evade the screening process, the law enforcement officer inter-
venes using his normal police powers and discretion. It should be
emphasized that under the procedures currently in effect, law en-
forcement officers do not routinely conduct a blanket search.
They may conduct a consent frisk for weapons if a passenger
cannot be cleared by the magnetometer, and will, of course, con-
143 See New York Times, Tune 5, 1973, at 1, col. 5; at 70, col. 5.
144 14 C.F.R. § 107.4 (1972).
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duct unconsented-to frisks if they believe the action appropriate
in the given circumstances.
B. Constitutionality of Searches Under the Current System
1. Introduction
Under the screening system currently in effect, the search
of the passenger's carry-on items is precedent to, and inde-
pendent of, the screening of the passenger by the metal detector.
The passenger will be screened by the magnetometer whether
or not contraband is found in his carry-on items. Therefore, the
question of the constitutionality of airport searches under current
screening procedures may properly be divided into two sections:
(1) the search of carry-on items; and (2) searches of the person
based upon positive magnetometer readings or other attendant
circumstances.
2. Search of Carry-On Items
The search by airline personnel of the passenger's carry-on
goods is, of course, accomplished without a warrant and seemingly
fits into none of the categories reserved for constitutionally per-
missible warrantless searches. Thus, to find the search constitu-
tional, one must either bring the search within the Terry doctrine
or demonstrate that a search conducted under this screening
procedure should be made per se as another exception to the
general requirement of a search warrant.
It is submitted that the search of carry-on items is inherently
unconstitutional. Terry is of no assistance, since it applies to
limited frisks of the person for weapons where reasonable su-
spicion exists that "criminal activity may be afoot." Under the
current procedure, the search is not of the person but of his
carry-on goods; and, even if Terry might be extended to cover
items in the immediate possession of the subject (a dubious
proposition), the search is far more than a mere frisk for weapons
and is not based upon any reasonable suspicion that the subject
is dangerous or is engaged in criminal activity other than the
mere fact that the subject is a prospective airline passenger. 145
To carve out another exception to the general requirement
145 See Ci,,m LmERTs, July, 1973, No. 297, at 6 and United States v. Davis,
482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
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of a search warrant in the case of an airport search is more
appealing but equally groundless. It would be a short step indeed
from considering the airport a "special zone" requiring a relaxation
of fourth amendment standards to allowing searches based upon
nothing more than a showing that a certain geographical area
had a high probability of criminal activity, something Judge
Weinstein specifically considered and rejected in Lopez.4 " It
should be emphasized that the Moreno court specifically rejected
the special zone concept for airports and stated that the "mere
suspicion" test for searches at border crossing areas by customs
officials should not be substituted for Terry's "reasonable su-
spicion" test with respect to airport searches. 47  It is true that
Judge Dooling in Mitchell held that the fourth amendment was
inapplicable to airport searches under the anti-hijacking program,
since he views the purpose of the searches as aviation security
rather than crime detection.4 " However, for reasons already
stated, it is submitted that this view is erroneous.149
Therefore, it would appear that since every prospective pas-
senger's carry-on baggage is searched irrespective of any suspicion
that the particular individual is dangerous or may be involved
in criminal activity, the search will not stand against the require-
ments of the fourth amendment. Consequently, the fruits of
such a search should be suppressed when they are sought to be
introduced into evidence at a subsequent criminal proceeding.
3. Search of the Physical Person Under Current
Screening Procedures
Frisks and searches of the physical person under the current
screening processes will likely differ little from those employed
prior to January, 1978, where the profile was not employed and
therefore will likely be seen as (1) classic Epperson8 ° cases
(frisk following positive magnetometer reading), (2) classic Mitch-
ell'51 cases (frisk or search following positive magnetometer read-
140 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1097-98 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
147 475 F.2d 44, 51 (5th Cir. 1978).
148 352 F. Supp. 38, 42-44 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
149 See text accompanying notes 96-98 supra.
150 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972), discussed
in text accompanying notes 79-87 supra.




ing plus other observable suspicious conduct), or (3) classic
Lindsey'l l cases (frisk conducted on pure Terry doctrine of
reasonable suspicion based upon observable behavior). There
is no reason to believe that the new procedures have changed
the law with regard to frisks and searches of the individual pas-
senger; and, while Epperson is good law, it is submitted that the
constitutionality of a frisk of an individual based merely upon a
positive magnetometer reading remains suspect when it is ad-
mitted that 50% of all individuals passing through the device
will activate it. A frisk based merely upon a positive magneto-
meter reading is little better than a frisk based upon no observable
facts whatsoever and thus is a frisk subject to attack under fourth
amendment standards. Surely Epperson is a great departure from
Lopez, which, along with Lindsey, is probably the finest opinion
thus far written in the area of airport searches.
If one could free Mitchell of its thesis that fourth amendment
standards do not apply to searches of potential airplane pas-
sengers, Judge Dooling's opinion would not be so disturbing,
given the use of a positive magnetometer reading plus observed
suspicious conduct as a basis for a frisk. At least the law enforce-
ment officer would be compelled to point to conduct on the part
of the defendant which, added to the positive magnetometer
reading, led him to reasonably suspect that the subject might be
dangerous or was engaged in criminal activity. It must be re-
peated that Judge Dooling was not concerned with a showing
by the officer of suspicious conduct, since he considered the entire
screening process beyond fourth amendment protection. The
point is that a positive magnetometer reading plus other observed
conduct test would more closely follow Terry than a magneto-
metpr-only test as devised in the Epperson decision, or the
Mitchell result, which would seemingly require no suspicion
whatever as a basis for a later search.
Lindsey has also been discussed rather fully, and as it is
grounded not upon any pre-board screening system but only
upon a law enforcement officer's reasonable suspicion based upon
observable, articulable facts, it seems to support a stop and frisk
based wholly on Terry standards. Such frisks, if they meet the
152 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972), discussed
in text accompanying notes 99-100 supra.
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Terry rules, will always be upheld. The problem with Lindsey-
type cases is that of predictability: every case must be decided
upon its own facts, and therefore it is difficult to give law enforce-
ment officers guidance as to when a frisk is valid, other than to
admonish them that mere hunches about a suspect will not
suffice to meet the reasonable suspicion requirement.
IV. THE FuTuim OF THE ANTI-HIJACKING PROGRAM
In discussing constitutionally permissible solutions to the air
piracy menace, and specifically, screening procedures which will
not violate the precepts of the fourth amendment, there are at
least the following possibilities: (1) maintain the current screen-
ing procedures; (2) move to a system of consent searches and
waiver of fourth amendment rights upon pain of non-passage for
those refusing to so consent; (3) consider all airport searches as
analogous to border searches and therefore as exceptions to
normal fourth amendment requirements; or (4) return to the
Gate Plan with a modified profile, and utilize hardware (i.e.,
magnetometers) at all gates.
A. Proposal: Retain the Current Screening System
Whether or not the reduction of air piracies may be attributed
to the present screening system, 15 3 the fact remains that there
have been only two air piracies of U.S. domestic aircraft since
the new system went into effect. Thus, legal questions regarding
search and seizures aside, the screening system must be con-
sidered an unqualified success as a device to deter air piracy.
However, there are practical problems as well as legal diffi-
culties inherent in the current system. From a practical point of
view, there have been passenger complaints about the search
procedures, especially from regular users of air transportation
facilities such as businessmen. This and other factors have caused
some airline officials to call the current screening program a
"costly overreaction" to the problem of air piracy. 4 Although
F.A.A. officials believe that the current system and the agreement
reached with Cuba in February, 1973, calling for mutual extra-
153 See text following note 4 supra.
154 N.Y. Times, June 5, 1973, at 70, col. 5.
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dition and prosecution of hijackers, 55 are responsible for bringing
the hijacking problem under control, these officials are commit-
ted to ending the current passenger screening system. 5 ' For
this reason, the F.A.A. and other governmental agencies have
been working on a new screening system designed to replace
the system now in operation."5 ' If complaints regarding the cur-
rent system subside, however, the new screening system will likely
remain on the back burner.
The writer has discussed at length the legal problems inherent
in the current system. It has been submitted that the fruits of
all carry-on baggage searches are inadmissible into evidence, and
that the ultimate search of the physical person of the passenger,
with nothing more than a positive magnetometer reading as a
basis, may yet be found unconstitutional, Epperson notwithstand-
ing. If one were not concerned with these fruits, only the
practical problems inherent in a "full search system" would re-
main. However, it would seem that the government has an
interest in prosecuting crimes related to air piracy, such as
attempting to carry weapons or dangerous devices aboard an
aircraft. The successful prosecutions of these offenses may be
sacrificed by continuing to implement the current system.158
Thus, if a screening system could be devised which would be as
effective as the current one in preventing air piracy but which
would at the same time meet constitutional standards such that
searches conducted under it would be upheld and the evidence
garnered admissible, the best of both worlds would be attained.
If this new system could also be made less onerous to the traveling
155 See N.Y. Times, February 14, 1973, at 1, cols. 1-2; N.Y. Times, February
16, 1973, at 1, col. 5, and at 5, col. 1. The "accord", as then Secretary of State
Rogers referred to the extradition agreement, might have been based upon the
1904 U.S.-Cuba Mutual Extradition Treaty. See MALLoY, 1 TREATIES, CONVEN-
TIONS, INTERNATIONAL AcTs, PROTOCOLS AND AcRMENTs BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND OTHE PowEs, 1776-1909, at 366 (1910). However, Secretary Rogers
never made mention of the 1904 Treaty in discussing the 1973 accord, and the
details of the accord have remained secret for political reasons. It is likely that the
1904 Treaty was not used as a basis for the 1973 accord because the United States
did not wish to expand its dealings with Premier Castro beyond the limited goal of
extradition of hijackers.
156 N.Y. Times, June 5, 1973, at 70, col. 6.
157 Id.
158 It is for this reason that the writer rejects any system established upon a
theory that only weapons offenses will be prosecuted and no others (such as drug
violations). See McGinley & Downs at 322-23.
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public than is the current system, the practical problems inherent
in the current system would be eliminated as well.
B. Proposal: A System of "Consent" Searches
Constitutional rights, such as those guaranteed by the fourth
amendment, may be waived by express, knowledgeable consent.
A rather recent Supreme Court decision held that the consent
must be clearly given and must not be induced by coercion or
duress. 159 The question thus becomes whether one can deny
the constitutionally guaranteed right to travel to a passenger
who declines to be searched. 00 This question cannot be truly
answered by stating that the constitutional right to travel does
not include the constitutional right to travel by air. There is
clearly a qualitative difference between travel by air and travel
by other means, and in many situations travel by air is the only
practical method. It should be noted in this context that while
it is true that the government may qualify the grant of a privilege,
it cannot do so when the qualification is the surrender of a con-
stitutional right. 6' Where a constitutional right is involved,
such as the right to travel, rather than a mere privilege, the
above principle should be at least equally binding.'62 Further-
more, searches should not be limited to those consented to by
prospective passengers because of the governmental and societal
interest in detecting and prosecuting the crimes related to air
piracy.163 As will be submitted later, it is unnecessary to burden
law enforcement officials with a "consent-only" search rule as a
practical matter, beyond the legal difficulties inherent in such a
system.
It should be noted that some federal courts of appeals have
recently dealt with the issue of consent in the context of an
airport search. In United States v. Doran "64 the Ninth Circuit, in
affirming the defendant's conviction for possession of narcotics, 65
stated in dictum that since signs and public address warnings an-
159 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). See also McGinley
& Downs at 321-22.160 See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 (1966).
161 See McGinley & Downs at 322.
162 Id.
163 See text accompanying notes 133-37 supra.
164 482 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1973).
165 Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (1970).
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nouncing that all passengers were subject to search were in use at
the time the defendant attempted to board, the defendant con-
sented to the search of his hand luggage by choosing to participate
in the boarding activity.166 Even though the Dorran court at-
tempted to distinguish its fact situation from that in United
States v. Davis,'6 7 decided some ten days earlier by another Ninth
Circuit panel, which held that no consent to the search had been
given, the fact remains that in neither Doran nor Davis was there
a conscious, clearly-given waiver of a constitutional right as re-
quired under the Supreme Court case Bumper v. North Caro-
lina.68 The Davis court, in fact, remanded its case to the district
court for a determination of the consent issue, since the Govern-
ment had not proffered any evidence on this subject.'69 The Davis
opinion also reaffirmed the principle that the constitutional right to
travel cannot be too broadly or indiscriminately burdened and
that, absent a compelling state interest, the right to travel may
not be conditional upon the relinquishment of another constitu-
tional right (here the fourth amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches). 70
The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Legato,17' also reached
the consent issue and found that the defendant had validly
waived his fourth amendment rights in consenting to the FBI
agent's search of a package later found to contain heroin. In
Legato, the defendants were given their Miranda warnings, were
informed of the reasons for their detention and were asked for
permission to search the package. The defendants never claimed
that they were coerced or that undue pressure was placed upon
them, and the court therefore found that a valid consent for the
search had been obtained." 2 Thus, Legato is distinguishable
from both Davis and Doran on its facts, in that no direct warnings
were given the defendants in the latter two cases. Further, one
may well contend, as did the Kroll court, that even in the Legato-
166 482 F.2d at 932.
167 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1978).
168391 U.S. 543 (1968).
169 482 F.2d at 914-15.
170 Id. at 912-13.
17' 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973).
172 id. at 413. Cf. United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir.




type situation the waiver is not really freely given when the
alternative to not giving one's consent to be searched is the refusal
of air passage.173
C. Proposal: Treat All Airport Searches as Analogous to Searches
at Border Crossings
Under this proposal, the type of screening procedures used at
the airport searches would simply be removed from fourth
amendment standards by analogizing these searches to customs
searches at border crossings. One Fifth Circuit panel implic-
itly recognized this analogy, 174 another has expressly adopted
it,'7 5 and a third court has apparently removed airport searches
from fourth amendment constraints on the ground that the
searches are conducted for the purpose of air security and not
crime detection. 6 Though Judge Dooling in Mitchell does not
directly analogize airport searches to customs border searches,
these latter searches have been justified constitutionally on the
ground that their purpose is to seize contraband, rather than to
apprehend criminals. Dooling's analysis would bring airport
searches under a very similar umbrella of protection from ap-
plication of fourth amendment standards. Davis is in accord with
Dooling's view.177
A recent law review article mildly criticized the above ap-
proach in the following manner:
To place the airport searches in a special category would cer-
tainly be a more direct and effective approach to the problem
than an ineffective and unconstitutional expansion of the Terry
rationale. Nevertheless, we regard such approach as prema-
ture since there has been no attempt made to utilize conven-
tional law enforcement methods in this area.178
This writer has already criticized the Mitchell decision as an
unwarranted restriction of fourth amendment safeguards. 7 9 This
writer agrees with the position taken above by McGinley and
173 351 F. Supp. at 155, aff'd, 431 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973).
174 United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 51 n.8 (5th Cir. 1973).
'75 See United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973).
176 United States v. Mitchell, 352 F. Supp. 38 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
177 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908-12 (9th Cir. 1973).
173 McGinley & Downs at 323.
179 See text accompanying and following note 98 supra. Special categorization
of certain types of searches is far too simple a way to obviate the necessity of
(Continued on next page)
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Downs that placing airport searches in a special category is
premature when they believe a far better system is available which
will not only detect potential aircraft hijackers but at the same
time protect the fourth amendment rights of individuals. The
writer will now turn to a discussion of that system.
D. Proposal: A Return to the Gate Plan with an Improved Profile
This writer would recommend a return to the Gate Plan as
the best means of detecting potential hijackers, protecting indi-
vidual rights against unwarranted and unreasonable searches and
seizures, and eliminating the onerous and costly procedures cur-
rently in effect. The F.A.A. and other governmental agencies are
currently working out the details of such a program, which would
include the use of a revised hijacker profile. s0
Although the Gate Plan seemingly was abandoned in favor
of the current screening system when hijackings marked by
unusual violence 8" occurred in September and October of 1972,
it is submitted: (1) that the Gate Plan, when fully implemented,
works to detect potential hijackers; and (2) that the Gate Plan
had not been fully implemented at all airports even as late as
the autumn of 1972 due to a lack of magnetometers and law
enforcement personnel.
The profle, when properly applied, singles out only about
1% of the nation's air passengers as selectees.'s8 Thus the profile
allows law enforcement officials to concentrate on that small
percentage of the traveling public deemed to share the traits of
former hijackers and at the same time protects the rights of the
other 99% of the traveling public against harassment. Since the
magnetometer clears another 50% or so of the selectees and the
furnishing of proper identification or the explanation of a positive
magnetometer reading clears another 80% of this latter group
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
applying fourth amendment standards. It would not take a great deal of imagina-
tion for a court to expand the "special category" rule to include any search for
contraband.
180 N.Y. Times, June 5, 1973, at 1, col. 5. The F.A.A. has also implemented
the use of x-ray machines at some airports for the purpose of searching carry-on
luggage. The use of these devices would seemingly suffer the same objections
raised by the physical search of carry-on items by airline employees, except that
the "intrusion' by the x-ray machine is clearly not as onerous as a physical search
of each passenger's carry-on luggage, and therefore an x-ray search might be up-
held where a physical search would not be. See text accompanying note 145 supra.181 N.Y. Times, June 5, 1973, at 1, col. 5.
182 See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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of selectees, only about 0.1% of all passengers screened are actu-
ally frisked and in this 0.1% are "practically all the potential
hijackers." 8 3
Thus, the Gate Plan, from the practical point of view, is not
onerous or offensive to the vast majority of the traveling public
and gives law enforcement officers an objectively constitutional
system of screening passengers at our nation's airports. In part,
the old Gate Plan was scrapped because the profile was becoming
publicly known and also because it was being misused and abused
by airline agents. The profile now being developed will be much
more sophisticated than the old one; and, if it is strictly applied,
may well result in even fewer persons having to undergo the full
screening process.184
Some writers have contended that the Gate Plan as formerly
applied did not ferret out potential hijackers, 8 5 but the statistics
prove otherwise. This writer was informed by the F.A.A. that
of the 27 hijackings which occurred in 1971, only one took place
after proper screening techniques were employed. This latter
case involved a man thoroughly screened prior to departure
who attempted to commandeer the aircraft after it had left the
ground. The pilot informed ground control he was being hijacked
and was told that the hijacker could not possibly have a weapon
since all passengers had been fully screened. After the aircraft
landed, the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested the hijacker.
In conclusion it can be noted that of the 27 hijackings in 1971,
only two hijackers failed to meet the hijacker proffie. A newer,
more sophisticated proffle would likely reduce even this low
percentage of "misses" still further. If the Gate Plan is properly
applied, it can maintain the excellent record produced by the
current screening system.
V. CONCLUSION
It is this writer's opinion that a return to a fully implemented
Gate Plan, with a more sophisticated profile and a magnetometer
at every boarding gate, will be as effective as current procedures
while at the same time meeting fourth amendment requirements
183 Id. at 1097.
184 N.Y. Times, June 5, 1973, at 70, col 5.
18 5 McGinley & Downs at 319.
Vol. 62.
AmPORT SEARCHES
and imposing a minimal burden on the traveling public. This, in
addition to the agreement reached with Cuba last year,",6 should
help to maintain control over the menace of air piracy. 8 ' It is
axiomatic that the air hijacking problem will end when the na-
tions of the world agree to refuse refuge to hijackers and to
prosecute them fully.188 The United States has taken the lead in
the world-wide effort to deter hijacking, as evidenced by its
contribution to and ratification of the 1970 Hague Convention' 9
and the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Air
Piracy. 90 As to domestic hijackings, naturally enough our first
concern, the recent record has been almost too good for belief.
The maintenance of this record, the protection of lives and
property of Americans traveling by air, and the protection of
their constitutional rights should be the goal of all those in
positions of authority. We all look forward to the day when
unharassed citizens may feel safe traveling by air, unconcerned
about the prospect of spending the evening in Havana or else-
where as the result of an unscheduled stop ordered by a skyjacker
-a prospect until recently all too real for many air passengers.
180 See note 155 supra.
187 See New York Times, June 5, 1973, at 70, col. 6.
188 See McGinley & Downs at 324.
189 Sept. 8, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192.
'
9 0 Oct 3, 1972, 23 U.S.T. -, T.IA.S. No. .
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